I have two streams of research. First, I am concerned with understanding the metaphysically significant content of our best scientific theories. Second, I aim to understand the social and ethical impacts of emerging technologies, particularly concerning uses of generative AI that have clear value in the current market landscape.
Publications:
What Are Empirical Consequences? On Dispensability and Composite Objects. Synthese, 2021.
In this paper, I argue against a recent composite object indispensability argument. Thomas Hofweber (2018, 2019) has argued that our scientific theories straightforwardly confirm the existence of composite objects. The idea is that experiments, like whether some particular metal bar is conductive, appeal to composite objects like metal bars (rather than just microphysical particles acting in concert). From this, Hofweber infers that composite objects make an empirical difference and that they are indispensable. I consider what happens when we take Hofweber seriously on his claim that this sort of “thick”' metaphysical content makes an empirical difference. I argue that it overgenerates cases of indispensability. It turns out that faces in the night sky could be indispensable to our best theories, which I take to be an intolerable result.
Works in Progress (Technology Ethics):
The Risks of AI-Generated, Hyper-Personalized Digital Advertisements. Under Review.
This paper examines the ethical implications of AI-generated, hyper-personalized digital advertisements, focusing on their potential impacts in both commercial and political spheres. Drawing on empirical studies and philosophical analysis, I argue that these AI-driven ads present unprecedented risks to consumer autonomy and democratic processes. In the commercial realm, I demonstrate how AI ads can exploit individual epistemic vulnerabilities, potentially circumventing traditional market safeguards against deceptive advertising. More critically, in the political domain, I argue that the combination of weakened truth restrictions and AI’s capacity to target individual biases creates a fertile ground for what I term ”wrongful propagandizing.” This research contributes to ongoing debates about AI ethics, digital privacy, and the future of democratic discourse. Email for Draft.
Works in Progress (Metaphysics of Science):
Putnam on Mathematics and Ontological Commitment. Revise and Resubmit at Synthese.
Hilary Putnam (2012) believed that mathematical claims are objectively true but that there are no mathematical objects. There are some initial problems with Putnam's position. First, it seems inconsistent with the conclusion of the so-called Quine-Putnam indispensability argument which concludes that there are mathematical objects. Second, it seems inconsistent to affirm that 2+2=4 is objectively true but deny that there are numbers. In this paper, I resolve both of these seeming inconsistencies. To the first, I present a novel interpretation of Putnam's indispensability argument that departs radically from the Quine-Putnam version. To the second, I introduce a new theory of metaphysical commitment. Email for Draft.
Equivalent Theories and Ontological Commitment. Under Review
The literature on theoretical equivalence in philosophy of physics is replete with physical theories that look quite different but are purportedly equivalent. Plausibly, there might exist a pair of equivalent theories that look different insofar as they existentially quantify over different entities. However, given the preeminence of the quantificational theory of ontological commitment, which tells us to look to quantified entities to inform ontology, such a pair of theories seems to be a problem. In this paper, I argue that there is no good way out of the problem, and I reject the quantificational theory of ontological commitment. Email for Draft.
On Dispensability and Indispensability. Under Review.
Many philosophers present dispensability or indispensability arguments that presuppose a specific conception of dispensability. The present paper explores and critiques the reigning conception of dispensability. In particular, I argue that it entails that too many things are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This entailment is at odds with the purpose for which we seek a conception of dispensability. In light of my arguments, I present a positive proposal that radically shifts our understanding of how dispensability and indispensability arguments work. This new proposal demands a metaphysics of science that splits the difference between pure empiricism and pure rationalism. Email for Draft.
No Science Without Composites. Drafting.
In this paper, I present an indispensability argument for the existence of composite objects. This argument relies on a widely held principle about ontological commitment. Philosophers (Dorr, Sider, Hofweber) have recently debated whether composite are indispensable to our best scientific theories. My argument differs from these in the sense that I consider the role that certain properties play in our scientific theories. I present examples of properties that play essential explanatory roles in our best microbiology, and I argue that these properties are had only by composite objects. My argument is one that philosophers of science and scientifically inclined metaphysicians should take seriously. Email for Draft.