I have two streams of research. First, I am concerned with understanding the metaphysically significant content of our best scientific theories. Second, I aim to understand the social and ethical impacts of emerging technologies, particularly concerning uses of generative AI that have clear value in the current market landscape.
Publications:
The Risks of AI-Generated, Hyper-Personalized Digital Advertisements, Philosophy & Technology, 2025.
Generative AI is set to transform digital advertising, which remains revenue juggernaut for much of the internet. In the current model, advertisers use personal data to target users with pre-made content. But with generative AI systems, they will soon be able to create novel advertisements, tailored in real time using individual behavioral and demographic profiles. Early studies suggest that these AI-generated, hyper-personalized ads are significantly more persuasive than traditional ones—even with today’s relatively limited models. As the technology advances, such ads are likely to become the dominant form of digital persuasion. I argue that this development threatens to undermine longstanding constraints that help keep advertising roughly honest. In particular, generative systems can learn to exploit users’ epistemic blind spots—areas where they are especially prone to believe false or misleading claims. While this poses familiar risks in commercial contexts, the stakes are even higher in political advertising, where personalized generative content may produce fragmented “political underworlds” and new forms of targeted propagandizing. I conclude by assessing both technological and regulatory options for mitigating these risks.
What Are Empirical Consequences? On Dispensability and Composite Objects. Synthese, 2021.
In this paper, I argue against a recent composite object indispensability argument. Thomas Hofweber (2018, 2019) has argued that our scientific theories straightforwardly confirm the existence of composite objects. The idea is that experiments, like whether some particular metal bar is conductive, appeal to composite objects like metal bars (rather than just microphysical particles acting in concert). From this, Hofweber infers that composite objects make an empirical difference and that they are indispensable. I consider what happens when we take Hofweber seriously on his claim that this sort of “thick”' metaphysical content makes an empirical difference. I argue that it overgenerates cases of indispensability. It turns out that faces in the night sky could be indispensable to our best theories, which I take to be an intolerable result.
Works in Progress (Technology Ethics):
Paper on Domestic Technological Virtues
Works in Progress (Metaphysics of Science):
Putnam on Mathematics and Ontological Commitment. Revise and Resubmit at Synthese.
Hilary Putnam (2012) believed that mathematical claims are objectively true but that there are no mathematical objects. There are some initial problems with Putnam's position. First, it seems inconsistent with the conclusion of the so-called Quine-Putnam indispensability argument which concludes that there are mathematical objects. Second, it seems inconsistent to affirm that 2+2=4 is objectively true but deny that there are numbers. In this paper, I resolve both of these seeming inconsistencies. To the first, I present a novel interpretation of Putnam's indispensability argument that departs radically from the Quine-Putnam version. To the second, I introduce a new theory of metaphysical commitment. Email for Draft.
Equivalent Theories and Ontological Commitment. Under Review
The literature on theoretical equivalence in philosophy of physics is replete with physical theories that look quite different but are purportedly equivalent. Plausibly, there might exist a pair of equivalent theories that look different insofar as they existentially quantify over different entities. However, given the preeminence of the quantificational theory of ontological commitment, which tells us to look to quantified entities to inform ontology, such a pair of theories seems to be a problem. In this paper, I argue that there is no good way out of the problem, and I reject the quantificational theory of ontological commitment. Email for Draft.
On Dispensability and Indispensability. Drafting.
Many philosophers present dispensability or indispensability arguments that presuppose a specific conception of dispensability. The present paper explores and critiques the reigning conception of dispensability. In particular, I argue that it entails that too many things are dispensable to our best scientific theories. This entailment is at odds with the purpose for which we seek a conception of dispensability. In light of my arguments, I present a positive proposal that radically shifts our understanding of how dispensability and indispensability arguments work. This new proposal demands a metaphysics of science that splits the difference between pure empiricism and pure rationalism. Email for Draft.
No Science Without Composites. Drafting.
In this paper, I present an indispensability argument for the existence of composite objects. This argument relies on a widely held principle about ontological commitment. Philosophers (Dorr, Sider, Hofweber) have recently debated whether composite are indispensable to our best scientific theories. My argument differs from these in the sense that I consider the role that certain properties play in our scientific theories. I present examples of properties that play essential explanatory roles in our best microbiology, and I argue that these properties are had only by composite objects. My argument is one that philosophers of science and scientifically inclined metaphysicians should take seriously. Email for Draft.